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Abstract: A suitable account of fiction must involve a conceptual dis-
tinction between (at least) the following figures, or roles: real authors, 
fictional narrators, fictional authors. Real authors are the real origi-
nal utterers of fiction-involving sentences in their fictional use, the 
one mobilizing pretense. They may coincide (although this would be 
rare) either with fictional narrators or with fictional authors. A fic-
tional narrator is the protagonist of a tale that is narrated in the first 
person: the internal point of view on the tale. A fictional author con-
stitutes the tale’s external point of view that vividly manifests itself 
when the tale is narrated by no protagonist. Fictional narrators, how-
ever, never coincide with fictional authors. For either one or the other 
is the fictional agent, the one-place factor of a narrow fictional con-
text of interpretation whose contribution is to provide a fictional 
truth-conditional content to the fiction-involving sentences of the rel-
evant tale.  
Keywords: Fictional agent; fictional author; fictional narrator; real 
author. 
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1. Introduction 
 A suitable account of fiction must involve a conceptual distinction be-
tween (at least) the following figures, or roles: real authors, fictional narra-
tors, fictional authors. Real authors are the real original utterers of fiction-
involving sentences in their fictional use, the one mobilizing pretense. They 
may coincide (although this would be rare) either with fictional narrators 
or with fictional authors. A fictional narrator is the protagonist of a tale 
that is narrated in the first person: the internal point of view on the tale. 
A fictional author constitutes the tale’s external point of view that vividly 
manifests itself when the tale is narrated by no protagonist.1 Fictional nar-
rators, however, never coincide with fictional authors. For either one or the 
other is the fictional agent, the one-place factor of a narrow fictional context 
of interpretation whose contribution is to provide a fictional truth-condi-
tional content to the fiction-involving sentences of the relevant tale. 
 Now, the reasons why we need all such figures just partly overlap with 
those Currie (1990) provides. We do need a fictional author for the very 
semantic reasons that make a fictional narrator necessary; namely, in order 
to account for the fictional truth-conditions, and truth-values, of fiction-
involving sentences in their fictional use. For we need either a fictional 
narrator or a fictional author, but not both, in order to have an agent, and 
just one, of the relevant narrow fictional context that enables a fiction-
involving sentence in the above use to have a fictional truth-conditional 
content: to repeat, the fictional agent. Yet we do not need such an author 
for epistemic reasons, having to do with reliability in narration; namely, the 
idea (ungrounded, as I go on to argue) that unlike the fictional narrator, 
the fictional agent is reliable since she is omniscient as regards the world of 
a fiction. As a result, the semantic reasons for why we need a fictional 
author do not coincide with those Currie (1990), among others, defends, 
which appeal to an unmotivated ascription of omniscience (as regards the 
events in a fictional world) to the fictional author. 
 The architecture of the paper is the following. In Section 1, I provide 
the aforementioned semantic reasons that enable us to draw a distinction 
                                                 
1  In Levinson’s (1996, 148) terms, she is a perceptual enabler. 
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between fictional narrators and fictional authors (whether or not they are 
identical with the real authors). In Section 2, I point out why we do not 
need epistemic reasons in order to draw the same distinction. Section 3 
concludes. 
2. In favor of the semantical reasons to distinguish between  
fictional narrators and fictional authors 
 A fiction-involving sentence is a sentence that, directly or indirectly, has 
to do with the tale that constitutes a literary fiction. As such, it may be 
used in different ways. Its first use is the fictional use,2 i.e., the use of that 
sentence that occurs in the pretense from which the corresponding tale orig-
inates; namely, when one makes believe that such and such is the case—
typically, in pretense plays viz. make-believe games.  
 By my lights, the best way of semantically accounting for the fictional 
use of a fiction-involving sentence appeals to a minimally contextualist 
framework (Recanati 2000, Voltolini 2006, 2016). According to that frame-
work, in that use a sentence behaves like an indexical sentence. This is to 
say, in order for it to get determinate truth-conditions, in particular fic-
tional ones, a fiction-involving sentence in its fictional use must be paired 
with a certain narrow context of interpretation à la Kaplan (1989); namely, 
a narrow fictional context, i.e., a set-theoretical entity constituted by the 
saturation of certain parameters (typically, an agent, a space, a time, and 
a world) and whose ‘world’ parameter is saturated by a world of fiction.3 
This world not only provides that sentence with fictional truth-conditions, 
by working as one of the parameters of the relevant narrow context of  
                                                 
2  For this terminology, see Kroon and Voltolini (2018). Currie (1990) labels it the 
fictive use. 
3  Whatever this world is from a metaphysical point of view: a possible, or even an 
impossible, world. (Im)possibilists à la Lewis (1983) or à la Priest (2016) would 
further say that such a world actually amounts to a set of (im)possible worlds, the 
worlds in which the sentence comes out as true. For my purpose, I am neutral on 
this option. 
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interpretation, but also allows the sentence to have a fictional truth-value, 
once it further works as a circumstance of evaluation for the sentence. 
 It is easy to show all this by means of an example. First of all, taken in 
its fictional use, the fiction-involving sentence: 
(1)  Anna Karenina commits suicide 
has fictional truth-conditions once it is interpreted in a narrow fictional 
context of interpretation whose ‘world’ parameter is saturated by a world 
of fiction, the world of Anna Karenina. Moreover, (1) is fictionally true 
when, so interpreted, it is true in that world, and fictionally false otherwise. 
As things do unfold this way in Anna Karenina’s world, (1) is fictionally 
true. On the other hand, 
(2)  Anna is a rockstar 
once interpreted with respect to the same narrow fictional context of inter-
pretation, is fictionally false, i.e., is false when evaluated in the same world, 
for in Anna Karenina’s world things do not unfold this way. 
 Now, a specification is immediately required as far as the ‘agent’ param-
eter of a narrow fictional context is concerned. Normally, the agent of this 
context of interpretation does not coincide with the real producer of the 
relevant fictionally used sentence, i.e., the real author—for simplicity, just 
the real original utterer of the sentence, the real story-teller.4 The only 
exceptions to the above noncoincidence claim are fictionalized autobio-
graphical tales. In such cases, the agent of the fictional narrow context of 
interpretation and the real author coincide—the real author pretends that 
she herself is such that certain things happen to her. 
 Let me again provide examples of both cases. In its fictional use, 
(3)  For a long while I used to go to bed early 
has fictional truth-conditions once it is interpreted in a narrow fictional 
context of interpretation whose ‘world’ parameter is saturated by the world 
of Marcel Proust’s Remembrance of Time Past and whose agent is not the 
                                                 
4  As a matter of fact, who is the real author of a fictionally used sentence may be 
a complicated matter. In the literature, there are many subdistinctions here. 
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same as Marcel Proust himself, the real original utterer of that sentence, 
the real author. Yet still in its fictional use, 
(4)  I wanted, I always wanted, I very strongly wanted 
has fictional truth-conditions once it is interpreted in a narrow fictional 
context of interpretation whose ‘world’ parameter is saturated by the world 
of Vittorio Alfieri’s Memoirs of the Life and Writings of Vittorio Alfieri, 
written by himself, yet whose agent is the same as Alfieri himself, the real 
original utterer of that sentence, the real author. 
 Interestingly enough, the distinction between the contextual agent (of a 
narrow fictional context of interpretation) and the real utterer (of a certain 
fictionally used sentence; hence, the real author) is not ad hoc. For not only 
is the above one of the many cases showing, following Predelli (1998, 2005), 
that one must draw a distinction between the narrow context of interpre-
tation (the one relevant for providing a truth-conditional interpretation for 
a sentence) and the context of utterance (the situation of discourse in which 
the sentence is originally mobilized), but it is also one of the many cases 
showing that this distinction may well affect the ‘agent’ parameter of a 
narrow context (see Voltolini 2006). For example, if a translator translates 
in her own language the indexical sentence tokened by Donald Trump in 
addressing Kim Jong-un, 
(5)  I would NEVER call him ‘short and fat’ 
in the relevant token of the translating sentence, the corresponding first 
person pronoun refers to Trump, the agent of the relevant narrow context 
of interpretation, not to the translator, the real utterer of that token. Like-
wise, if a clairvoyant utters: 
(6)  I am Manitou 
the agent of the relevant narrow context of interpretation for that sentence 
to which the token of “I” refers is Manitou, not the clairvoyant herself, who 
is the mere real utterer of the above token of (6). 
 But if the fictional agent of a narrow fictional context of interpretation 
is normally not the real utterer of the relevant fictionally used sentence, 
who is she? It seems that here we must face a choice. One option is that 
the agent of a narrow fictional context of interpretation is the fictional 
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narrator, i.e., the protagonist of the tale who, it is pretended, tells the story 
from an internal point of view. Since she narrates the tale in the first person, 
this is often labeled the homodiegetical narrator.5 Sometimes (there are a 
number of such cases, actually), the fictional narrator is also the same as 
the real author of the tale; namely, when the internal protagonist of the 
tale mobilizes a fictionalized autobiography, as in the Alfieri example in-
volving (4). Yet mostly, the fictional narrator is an imaginary individual 
who exists only in the world of the tale.6 The other option is that the agent 
of a narrow fictional context of interpretation is not the fictional narrator, 
but the fictional author, i.e., the external point of view from which the tale 
is told in that context.7 This is often labeled the heterodiegetical narrator, 
the one that narrates the tale in the third person.8 Yet this label is somehow 
inappropriate. For sometimes (again, there are a number of such cases), the 
fictional author may even coincide with the real author herself, so that the 
first person is again mobilized.9 This happens if that author pretends that 
she herself, rather than simply some individual or other, tells the relevant 
tale, but without being one of its protagonists, and either keeping her per-
sona or not.10 Here is an example of this situation; when Alessandro Man-
zoni, the real author of The Betrothed, enters the tale not as a protagonist 
of the tale itself, but as its external point of view: 
                                                 
5  Cf. e.g. Predelli (2020). Clearly enough, sometimes a tale is told by different 
characters. Yet for any single sentence of that tale, taken in its fictional use, there 
is just one fictional narrator, if any. 
6  Lamarque-Olsen (1994, 62) simply call it a narrator, taking her as a figure in the 
world of the fiction. 
7  Cf. Currie (1990). See also Levinson (1992). In Lamarque-Olsen’s (1994, 62) 
terms, this is the fictional narrator. 
8  Cf. again Predelli (2020). 
9  Granted, there may be cases in which what seems to be a fictional author coin-
ciding with the real author is just the fictional narrator (consider a ‘metafictional’ 
version of The Betrothed in which (7) below is uttered again.) But once the fictional 
author is severed from the fictional narrator, as I am claiming, she does not have to 
coincide with the real author (pace Kania 2005, Boyd 2017). 
10  In Currie’s (2010) terms, the real author is then a mere implied author.  
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(7)  My five-and-twenty readers may imagine what impression such 
an encounter as has been related above would make on the mind 
of this pitiable being. 
Yet mostly, in being just the external point of view from which the tale is 
told, the fictional author is neither the real author, nor even, pace Currie 
(1990, 76,214), an imaginary individual, as the fictional narrator instead is. 
For she is not a protagonist of the tale that exists only in the fictional world 
of the tale. Rather, she is imaginatively located at the periphery of that 
world (Predelli 2017, 2020). For, as Predelli stresses (2020, 50,53), it is 
fictionally the case that, unlike the fictional narrator, she is causally im-
mune from what happens in that world.11 
 Now, this distinction between the fictional narrator and the fictional 
author arises because sometimes at least, there is no tale’s protagonist who 
is pretended to tell the story, hence there is no fictional narrator. As a 
result, someone else must enter the fore as playing a descriptive role towards 
the fiction itself: the fictional author. This typically, but not exclusively 
(e.g., if paintings may display narratives, they also display fictional au-
thors), happens with mindless fictions (Currie 1990), i.e., fictions in which 
one pretends that there is neither language nor intelligent life. In such a 
case, a real author indeed pretends that a fictional author tells a story that 
there is a both languageless and mindless situation (that a fortiori involves 
no fictional narrator). Thus, the fact that the tale is a third-person narra-
tion does not rule out that there is no contextual agent for it; no narrator, 
yet an agent, the fictional agent. See Currie’s own example: 
(8)  [It’s a humanless world.] A lizard basked in the sun. A breeze 
stirred the leaves of a flower nearby. A bird flew past. Too bad 
there was no one around to record the event. 
                                                 
11  When the fictional author does not coincide with the real author, she plays the 
same role as Currie’s (2010) implied author qua second author. Granted, there is 
sometimes a narratorial self-effacement with which the real author disguises either 
the fact that she herself is the fictional author or the fact that she herself is the 
fictional narrator. Yet pace Kania (2005:50), this self-effacement does not prevent 
the need for distinguishing her, qua fictional author, from the fictional narrator. For 
qua fictional author but not qua fictional narrator, she is (fictionally) causally inert. 
Real Authors and Fictional Agents  67 
Organon F 28 (1) 2021: 60–75 
 This form of pretense is not particularly problematic. First of all, it is 
just an extension of the case in which an author may pretend, not only 
about a previous time, but also about a time in which nobody existed, that 
someone describes how the world unfolded at that time. Cf.: 
(9)  [Now it’s 1940.] Hitler is attacking France 
(10) [Now it’s the Big Bang.] Matters spreads everywhere. 
 Moreover, imposing a contextual agent in this way in order for a narrow 
context of interpretation to provide a sentence with determinate truth-con-
ditions is not restricted to cases involving fiction, but it has an independent 
justification. In fact, as Predelli (2001) stresses, indexical sentences can be 
interpreted also in narrow possible contexts whose worlds contain no lan-
guage and possibly no intelligent life either. Consider e.g.: 
(11) I am hungry now 
and interpret it in a narrow possible context in which nobody utters sen-
tences containing more than three words. So interpreted, the sentence in 
question is true in the possible world of that context iff the agent of the 
context, who obviously is not its utterer in that context, is hungry at the 
contextual moment in that world. Mutatis mutandis, the same holds of: 
(12) It is sunny now 
when interpreted in such a context (there must be a contextual agent even 
if there is no contextual utterer). 
 As I said before, in a few cases, the fictional author who is the fictional 
agent of the relevant narrow fictional context of interpretation is also the 
real author. Consider e.g. how the previous mindless fiction narrated by (8) 
might be suitably modified: 
(8*) A lizard basked in the sun. A breeze stirred the leaves of a flower 
nearby. A bird flew past. Too bad, my dear readers, there was no 
one around to record the event. 
 What is important, however, is that the fictional author never coincides 
with the fictional narrator.12 For, as I just stressed above, we need a fictional 
                                                 
12  Pace Currie (2010), it is then improper to call the fictional author a narrator. 
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author for semantic reasons; namely, in order for the relevant narrow fic-
tional context of interpretation to always have an agent, the fictional agent, 
and just one agent in order to saturate the ‘agent’ parameter of the context. 
Thus, when the context seems to lack an agent, because there is no fictional 
narrator, we must presuppose that there is a fictional author that plays 
that agential role.13 If instead there already is a fictional narrator in the 
context, she may legitimately work as the fictional agent, thereby ruling 
out a fictional author to play that role.14 In this respect, by appealing to the 
semantic necessity of a contextual fictional agent—who, as we just saw, 
may be either the fictional narrator or the fictional author (but not both)—
I may adhere to the so-called Necessity Narrator Thesis, which always re-
quires a narrator (an agent, in my terms) for a narrative.15  
3. Against the epistemic reasons to distinguish between  
fictional narrators and fictional authors 
 As we have seen in the previous Section, a semantic reason is available 
as to why we must draw a distinction between fictional narrators and fic-
tional authors. To recap, whenever there is a fictional narrator, there is no 
fictional author. For the ‘agent’ parameter of the relevant narrow fictional 
context of interpretation, which we need in order to supply the relevant 
fiction-involving sentence with fictional truth-conditions in its fictional use, 
is already saturated by that narrator. 
 As a result, we do not need fictional authors over and above fictional 
narrators for epistemic reasons; namely, because fictional narrators are 
                                                 
13  The fictional author is thereby a minimal narrating agency, in Matravers’ (2014) 
terms. 
14  So not only we do not need to postulate a second narrator (i.e., the fictional 
author), as Matravers (2014, 127) says, but we must not do so. 
15  Even though, as we have seen above, I do not require that the fictional agent be 
always distinct from the real author. For this thesis, cf. originally Chatman (1990). 
It is also presented but negatively discussed in Boyd (2007, 285). For a further 
discussion, see Livingston (2001). Furthermore, Currie’s (1995) controlling narrator, 
the narrator whose mode of presenting the story imaginatively coincides with the 
work’s text as a whole, should be the same as the fictional agent. 
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sometimes unreliable (Currie 1990, 1995), hence what it is pretended that 
they tell is fictionally false, i.e., false in the world of the relevant tale. For 
there is no guarantee that the fictional author is an omniscient descriptor 
of the tale’s world. As the external point of view from which the tale is told, 
she may be unreliable as well. Granted, we have famous examples of unre-
liable fictional narrators: for example, the personage of Humbert Humbert 
in Lolita. In their fictional use, 
(13) I am named “Humbert Humbert” 
(14) I have been seduced by Lolita 
are fictionally true and fictionally false respectively. For when interpreted 
in the relevant narrow fictional context of interpretation that has Lolita‘s 
world as its world, (13) is true in that world iff the fictional narrator who 
is the agent of that context, i.e., Humbert Humbert, is so named in that 
world, while (14) is true in that world iff the fictional narrator who is the 
agent of that context, i.e., Humbert Humbert again, has been so seduced in 
that world. But (13) is indeed fictionally true, for in that world Humbert 
Humbert does have such a name, while (14) is fictionally false, for in that 
world he has seduced Lolita. Yet we may well have examples of unreliable 
fictional authors as well. Suppose that the previous mindless fiction told by 
(8) continued as follows: 
(8+) Darkness was spread everywhere. 
 Hence the sentence inaugurating (8), namely: 
(8-) A lizard basked in the sun 
would be fictionally false. For when interpreted in the relevant narrow fic-
tional context of interpretation that has the world of that fiction as its 
world, that sentence is true in that world iff in that world a lizard basked 
in the sun. Yet in that world darkness was spread everywhere, as (8+) 
fictionally truly says; so, there is no sun in it. So, the agent of that context, 
who is the fictional author since there is no fictional narrator, would be as 
unreliable as the fictional narrator Humbert Humbert in Lolita’s tale.16 
                                                 
16  For this way of accounting for inconsistent fictions, see also Predelli (2020, 
113,115). Strangely enough, after having said that, Predelli converges with Currie’s 
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 This shouldn’t be surprising. For in general, even when they are exter-
nal, points of view are partial ways of grasping situations. Consider the case 
in which one misdescribes a past situation by pretending it is contemporary, 
as in the following variation of (10): 
(17) [Now it’s the Big Bang.] Dinosaurs are around. 
This unreliability even of some fictional authors allows us to dispense with a 
well-known and widespread criticism of the idea of a fictional author that has 
precisely to do with her supposed omniscience (Byrne 1993, Matravers 1995, 
Kania 2005, Boyd 2017); namely, how can she know what happens in the 
tale, especially when the tale concerns what is in the protagonists’ minds?17  
 This point has an interesting consequence. Since fictional authors have 
been introduced here just in order to account for the fictional truth-condi-
tions of fiction-involving sentences in their fictional use, the semantic rea-
sons for this introduction do not coincide with those Currie (1990) provides. 
For, in having to do with the real truth-conditions of fiction-involving sen-
tences in their different internal metafictional use18—that is, the use in 
which such sentences say the same as the corresponding parafictional  
                                                 
idea that the fictional author—the peripheral teller, as he labels her) is omniscient 
(ib., 53). Yet he immediately admits that the peripheral teller is qualifiable in terms 
of factors that would make her immediately biased, such as belonging to a gender, 
having a certain psychology, or being a member of a certain cultural community 
(ib., 54,61,117). Currie (1990) might further reply that this case does not force one 
to consider the fictional author unreliable, for one might instead both take (8+) and 
(8-) to be fictionally true and ascribe the fictional author inconsistent beliefs in the 
truth-conditions of the corresponding parafictional sentences (see immediately be-
low). Yet independently of whether this reply works (for some doubts, see Kroon 
and Voltolini 2019), it would make the fictional author hardly idealizable, as Currie 
wishes (again, see below). 
17  On behalf of Currie, Kroon and Voltolini (2019) note that since “the postulation 
of a teller for every tale is simply a staple of literary and aesthetic theory (Currie 
1990, 75–6), […] not worrying about how the teller got her information […] might be 
another such staple”. Yet, as they go on to say (ib.), “one worry about such a 
response is that it seems little different from saying we should treat the story as if 
it were told from a God’s eye point of view.” 
18  This is the use that (Currie 1990) labels metafictive. 
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sentences, i.e., sentences of the form “in story S, p” (Bonomi 2008)—the 
semantic reasons for which Currie introduces a fictional author rely crucially 
on ascribing omniscience (as regards the facts of the tale) to the fictional 
author. According to Currie, what is (really) true in the story is a matter 
of what it is reasonable to infer as regards what the fictional author believes: 
“The belief set of the fictional author—the set of propositions he believes—
is the set of propositions that go to make up the story” (1990, 76). More 
technically, 
“FS(p)” is true iff it is reasonable for the informed reader to infer 
that the fictional author of S believes that p (Currie 1990, 80). 
 Now, giving (real) truth-conditions of this sort for parafictional sen-
tences is precisely to exploit the idea that the fictional author has a sort of 
omniscience as regards the relevant fictional world, insofar as she is pre-
tended to tell the story as a known fact (“we make believe that the fictional 
author is presenting us with information he knows to be true”, Currie 1990, 
94). It is indeed reasonable to make that inference insofar as the fictional 
author has cognitive authority about that fictional world: “the teller (the 
fictional author) is identified as the person uniquely responsible for this 
text” (Currie 1990, 153). 
 Yet at this point a problem may arise for my account. If one assumes 
Currie’s account of the real truth-conditions of parafictional sentences, one 
may wonder whether the previous example of the prolonged mindless fiction 
(fictionally) told by (8) plus (8+) supplies us with a genuine case of a fic-
tional author’s unreliability. For in that case, one may indeed say that the 
really false parafictional sentence: 
(16) In the prolonged mindless fiction, a lizard basked in the sun 
is also false according to Currie’s account. For, given how the mindless 
fiction continues, it is not reasonable to infer that the fictional author be-
lieves that a lizard basked in the sun. Instead, reasonably enough, given 
how the prolonged mindless fiction ends, the fictional author believes that 
darkness was spread everywhere, hence she does not believe that a lizard 
basked in the sun. This explains why in its fictional use, (8-) turns out to 
be fictionally false, i.e., is false in the world of the prolonged mindless fiction, 
without postulating any unreliability on the fictional author’s part. 
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 Yet in other cases, not only is there a mismatch between the truth-value 
that the relevant parafictional sentence really has and the truth-value that 
it should have according to Currie’s account, but this mismatch is also due 
to the fictional author’s unreliability. For in these cases the parafictional 
sentence is really false and yet it is reasonable to infer that the fictional 
author believes its embedded content; thus, implausibly, the relevant par-
afictional sentence turns out to be really true according to Currie’s account.  
This situation typically occurs in a case where epistemic indistinguishability 
is not matched by metaphysical indistinguishability. Consider a version of 
Robert Stevenson’s most famous tale where no protagonist tells the tale in 
the first person and the following sentence is fictionally used: 
(17) It is unclear whether Dr. Jekyll is the same as Mr. Hyde. 
 Yet the version of the tale is such that what transpires in it is also the 
case in the standard version of the tale, namely, that the two guys, Dr. 
Jekyll and Mr. Hyde, are identical. For example, in the modified version, it 
is (fictionally) told that whatever the first guy does, so does the second. In 
such a version, there is a fictional author that tells the story, yet she is 
unreliable. (17) is indeed fictionally false: in the world of this version’s tale, 
it is still determinately the case that the two guys are the same. So, the 
corresponding parafictional sentence: 
(18) According to the tale’s version, it is unclear whether Dr. Jekyll is 
the same as Mr. Hyde 
is really false as well. Yet it should, implausibly, come out as really true 
according to Currie’s account. For it is reasonable to infer that the fictional 
author believes that it is unclear whether Dr. Jekyll is the same as Mr. 
Hyde. 
 Granted, Currie might reply as follows. Since, given her omniscience as 
regards the relevant fictional world, the fictional author is a postulate (Cur-
rie 1990, 126), hence an idealization, the above parafictional sentence must 
count as really false, not as really true. For it is unreasonable to infer that 
an idealized fictional author believes that it is unclear that Dr. Jekyll and 
Mr. Hyde are the same. 
 But there is no reason to idealize the fictional author in this way. For 
her being located in the (fictionally) causally inert periphery does not  
Real Authors and Fictional Agents  73 
Organon F 28 (1) 2021: 60–75 
prevent her from being essentially biased, by her belonging to a gender or 
anyway having a certain psychology as well as being a member of a certain 
cultural community, as Predelli (2000) repeatedly stresses (see fn.13 above). 
Indeed, remember that even the fictional author is essentially perspectival: 
she represents a point of view, albeit external, to the fiction’s world. Hence, 
qua such a point, she may imperfectly grasp the facts of such a world.19 In 
the end, therefore, the fictional author may be as unreliable as the fictional 
narrator is, when there is any. 
4. Conclusions 
 In this paper, I provided a semantic reason to draw a distinction between 
fictional narrators and fictional authors, independently of whether they are 
respectively the same as the real authors of fiction-involving sentences in 
their fictional use, as is sometimes (actually, rarely) the case. This reason 
hinges on the fact that in order for such sentences to have determinate 
fictional truth-conditions in their fictional use, there must always be just 
one fictional agent for the narrow fictional context that enables the relevant 
fiction-involving sentence to have those truth-conditions. Hence, there must 
be a fictional agent, yet she can be either the fictional narrator or the fic-
tional author, but not both. This reason allows us to dispense with appealing 
                                                 
19  This would immediately transpire if we admitted pictorial narrators, as hy-
pothesized above in the text. If there are any, pictorial narrators are peripherical. 
Indeed, a pictorial narrator represents the only proper and causally inert pictorial 
point of view from which, unlike the picture’s vehicle - the physical basis of a picture 
- the picture’s subject - the scene presented by the picture - is seen in the picture 
(cf. e.g. Hopkins 1998). Now, the phenomenon of anamorphosis shows that only from 
a certain physical vantage point, one activates the proper pictorial point of view 
from which the picture’s scene is seen in the picture. From other vantage points, 
different improper pictorial points of view on that scene are activated. Consider Hans 
Holbein the Younger’s The Ambassadors. If one wants to see in that painting the 
scene containing a skull located at the ambassadors’ feet, one must endorse the 
proper pictorial point of view that is achieved from locating oneself on the painting’s 
very side. If one faces the painting frontally, one can only endorse an improper point 
of view from which the scene’s skull is not seen in the painting.  
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to an epistemic reason to draw the very same distinction, a reason that 
mobilizes the alleged omniscience of the fictional author. For there is no 
need that such an author be always reliable.20 
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